W hen disaster strikes, municipal departments form the foundation of the local government response. These departments are expected to perform their essential functions to contribute productively to response and recovery efforts. Yet local government agencies cannot serve their constituents and aid in local recovery efforts if they are preoccupied with reestablishing their own critical organizational infrastructure after disaster. Open systems theory, as defined in public administration academe, recognizes that there are complex interactions between an entity and its environment. The basic idea is that all complex entitiessuch as organizations-are composed of numerous diverse elements linked by strong interactions, and that organizations both effect and are affected by their environment. Viewed from this perspective, disasters that negatively affect the operations of public organizations ultimately cascade through the community by way of disruptions that impact "the flow of goods and services, unemployment, business interruption, and declines in levels of economic activity and productivity" (Tierney, Lindell, & Perry, 2001, p. 6). Past research has alluded to the importance of local government organizations to social and economic systems (Bolin, 1990; Tierney, 1995 Tierney, , 1997 Ward, Morris, & Carlile, 1989) and documented the increase in demands for public services post-disaster (Alper & Kupferman, 2003; Brouillette, 1970; National Fire Protection Association, 1991). Therefore, plans that ensure the continuity of local government operations are vital to the economic health and general welfare of a community.
provision of these services. Recent global acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and power failures illustrate the need for COOP planning and capabilities. But COOP planning also stresses the importance of preparedness for "quiet" catastrophes, those seemingly minor emergenciesbuilding fires, computer crashes, inclement weather, and similar events-that may wreak havoc on a department's ability to provide essential service.
Although there has been a concerted effort by the federal government to construct and implement COOP plans, the states and their municipalities have moved more slowly, though the importance of such planning is rapidly being realized (Hoene, Baldassare, & Brennan, 2002) . Except for one study on government continuity following earthquakes (Perry & Lindell, 1997) , remarkably little attention has been paid to the documentation of local government COOP planning efforts. Indeed, most studies that have been conducted have primarily measured COOP planning at the federal level (Petersen, 2003 (Petersen, , 2005 . Moreover, Tierney et al. (2001) report that knowledge concerning planning and preparedness activities among government organizations-particularly those not directly involved in public safety-is lacking.
Clearly, the public works department is integral to a local jurisdiction's emergency response and recovery operations. Brouillette (1970) observed that the public works is responsible for such vital services as keeping the streets open, the distribution of water for both drinking and fire suppression, and maintaining the sewer system. Although these services are not generally considered to be emergency services, they are key to a community's crisis response and disaster recovery efforts. Hence, COOP planning should be an important component in public works emergency planning efforts.
This article addresses the issue of planning to reduce or minimize service disruptions to critical municipal lifeline services provided by public works departments. The premise is that public works agencies must have structural and personnel integrity to maintain service delivery in the face of an unexpected event. The data presented here characterize the extent to which public works departments have attended to COOP plan elements that would enhance the level of operational continuity during disaster. This data was collected in a survey of public works agencies in the southwest United States. Information on the extent of COOP plan adoption alerts public works managers and community emergency planners to the issue of operational continuity, identifies important COOP plan elements, and provides basic information for assessing organizational preparedness. Such information provides a useful snapshot of current COOP planning activities and can be used as a tool to evaluate the vulnerability of public works departments to service disruptions.
The Public Works Agencies Studied
The population and sample frame selected for this survey research is in Region VII of the American Public Works Association. Region VII encompasses the states of Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. The sample for this research was obtained from a membership roster of the American Public Works Association, an international educational and professional association comprising public agencies, private contractors, elected officials, city managers, and interested individuals. The APWA is the largest public works organization of its kind with a reported membership of more than 26,000.
The unit of analysis was the municipal public works organization. An initial query of Region VII (the area representing the target study population) produced a list of 1,810 members representing 350 municipal and county public works agencies as well as private sector contractors. Some of these agencies represented a single aspect or division of public works, such as roads, utilities, or solid waste, rather than a full-service public works department. The search was refined to include municipal (cities and towns) full-service public works agencies. A total of 142 full-service municipal public works departments were mailed a questionnaire. After three follow-up mailings-two using e-mail and one by direct mail-96 directors returned the questionnaire, achieving a 67.6% return rate. This completion rate is above 60%, the level specified by Babbie (2005) as required to meaningfully analyze probability sample data.
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Public works is responsible for such vital services as keeping the streets open, the distribution of water for both drinking and fire suppression, and maintaining the sewer system. Although these services are not generally considered to be emergency services, they are key to a community's crisis response and disaster recovery efforts.
In most instances, the director or other senior manager was asked to complete the questionnaire, acting as an informant about the practice of the public works department. Senior management was selected to complete the survey to ensure that the respondent had an organization-wide perspective as well as some years of experience in dealing with public works challenges. Obviously, this means that senior management was asked to assess his or her own organization. Critics may point out that this could lead to positive bias because managers tend to overestimate their own organization's level of preparedness. However, if a positive bias exists, it is likely to be constant across all of the organizations in this study.
Background on Continuity Planning
In the past few years there has been an interest in constructing government COOP plans, particularly in the federal executive branch. The business community has long promoted the practice of "business recovery planning," though there is some distinction between COOP plans and a business recovery plan. This distinction has roots in the differing composition of government agencies and private enterprise. Whereas COOP planning seeks to ensure continued delivery of essential public services, business recovery planning seeks to preserve a business' market share and survival. However, the overall objective-uninterrupted operabilityremains largely the same in both types of planning. Ultimately, government COOP planning activities are similar to those that are broadly integrated into private sector business recovery planning (Perry & Lindell, 2006) .
In all probability, departments that do not engage in COOP planning may encounter more frequent, longer lasting, and more costly disruptions in service than those departments with a high-quality, detailed COOP plan in place (Emergency Management Australia, 1997). Although there is a dearth of literature and academic study on the effectiveness of COOP planning in government, there is evidence to suggest that business recovery planning improves the probability of survival in private sector organizations. The Institute for Business and Home Safety (2007) estimates that 25% of businesses that close following a disaster never reopen. This is perhaps an overly conservative estimate. Data reported in a study by Cerullo and Cerullo (2004) show that 43% of companies impacted by crisis never reopen, and that a further 29% fail within 2 years of the event. They also site a study conducted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) following Hurricane Andrew in 1992. It found that for businesses that received storm damage, 80% of those lacking a business continuity plan failed within 2 years.
Historically, interest in government COOP planning can be traced as far back as the beginning of the Cold War era in the 1950s. Attention to such planning seemed to wane after the fall of the Soviet Union despite the seemingly positive impact such planning could have on government operational continuity following natural disasters, technology failures, or even routine emergencies. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought about renewed interest in how governments would continue their essential functions in the wake of disaster: Spurred in part by occasional warnings of potential terrorist threats in the post-9/11 era, some policymakers have intensified their focus on continuity of operations (COOP) issues. COOP planning is a segment of . . . government contingency planning linked to continuity of government (COG). Together, COOP and COG are designed to ensure survival of a constitutional form of government and the continuity of essential . . . functions. (Petersen, 2005, p. 1) Disasters occur in many forms and may be categorized as political (e.g., terrorism or armed strife), economic-technical (e.g., building collapses, chemical spills), social (e.g., riots, violent labor strikes), and natural (e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes; Kim & Lee, 2001) . Such events can "scramble plans, interrupt continuities, and brutally paralyze normal government operations" (Farazmand, 2001, p. 3) . Although much of the renewed attention to COOP planning has been focused on preparedness for terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) events, "operational activation of a COOP might also include routine building renovation or maintenance; (Petersen, 2003, p. 1) .
The importance of COOP planning for local government agencies was illustrated by the August 2003 power outage that affected much of the eastern United States and Canada. During the outage, New York City struggled to provide critical lifeline services to residents and businesses. Problems in maintaining these services were generally attributed to a lack of communication, inadequate redundancy of various essential systems, an inadequate cache of critical supplies, inability to mobilize essential personnel, and/or inconsistent command and coordination among the various emergency operations centers (Alper & Kupferman, 2003) . A mayor's task force formed to investigate New York City's response to the blackout concluded that city agencies must clearly identify their essential functions and provide plans for ensuring the continuity of those services (New York City Emergency Response Taskforce, 2003) .
Federal Preparedness Circular-65 (FPC-65) recommends that all elements of a continuity plan be operational within 12 hours of activation, and that they be capable of providing sustained operations for up to 30 days (FEMA, 2004a) . In addition to identifying the essential functions of an organization, elements of a complete COOP plan include establishing the concepts, actions, and procedures for providing continued performance of the organization's essential functions; identifying a line of succession for essential positions and providing clear delegation of authority for making key decisions; preparation and maintenance of alternate operating facilities and emergency operations centers; creating interoperable modes of communication and building redundancy of critical communications and information technology; protecting vital records and databases, including legal and financial records; preparing for the use and protection of human resources; testing, training and exercising the continuity plan; preparing for devolution of control and direction in the event that an agency's senior members are incapacitated or incapable of executing direction of the agency's essential functions from either the primary or alternate facilities; and making plans for reconstitution of a new operating site and consolidation of resources after a catastrophic event.
COOP planning is intended to be an "all-hazards" planning tool (FEMA, 2004b) . For decades before 9/11, emergency managers had been supporting the all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness and the Integrated Emergency Management System. Rather than planning and preparing for different types of events individually, the all-hazards planning focus is generic, covering hazards collectively. In this way, COOP plans are applicable to a wide range of events that have the potential to disrupt essential services.
Components of a Continuity Plan
The primary objective of COOP planning is to establish plans and procedures to be used in the event of an interruption of service. Responding to an unanticipated event, restoring time-sensitive essential services, and eventually reestablishing normal operational capacity are goals that are encompassed in a COOP plan. A COOP plan is not a step-by-step emergency procedure; rather, it is a guide for establishing an emergent structure and lines of authority that enable organizations to carry out their mission during a crisis.
There is a lot of information available that describe the content and processes of organizational COOP planning. Much of this guidance is elaborate. planning activities, whereas to achieve a score of 5.00 a department would have to have completed all elements of that component of the COOP plan and tested them in a full-scale exercise. The questions included a brief description of the extent of completion for each level of response. The descriptors used to standardize levels of planning in each element are shown in Table 1 . A rating of preliminary states that management has engaged in some discussion of the planning item, but no explicit planning had been conducted. A department that reports an item of COOP as being "completed" must have exercised their COOP plan in a full-scale exercise. The following discussion provides a definition for each element of a COOP plan and summarizes the levels of planning as reported by public works directors.
PLANS
Planning, such as COOP planning, "is designed to provide some element of stabilitywhether of organizational structure, role, task responsibility, or the physical environmentwhen other elements are in flux or situations demand unplanned-for action" (Wachtendorf, 2004, p. 18) . Previous research suggests that high levels of preparedness are directly correlated to effective response in crisis situations (Mileti, Drabek, & Haas, 1975) and planning Somers / PLANNING FOR OPERATIONAL CONTINUITY 455 has been demonstrated to be a key component of such preparedness (Kartez & Lindell, 1987; Mileti et al., 1975) . Thus, an axiom of the integrated emergency management system is that governments, and organizations, can and should plan for disasters (Drabek & Hoetmer, 1991; McLoughlin, 1985; Petak, 1985; Schneider, 1995) .
Plans and procedures are intended to provide department personnel with vital information they need to operate in emergency situations. Such plans and procedures are needed for three phases of COOP implementation: activation and relocation, operating from alternate operating facilities, and reconstruction and return to normal operations.
To assess the level of continuity planning in public works organizations, directors were first asked, "To what extent has your Department developed written plans to facilitate your continuing operations in the event of a crisis in your community or in your physical structures?" It was suggested to respondents that a crisis could be a flood in the community, a major water pipe leak that requires a facility to close, or a terrorist attack that prevents the department from using normal processes or buildings to deliver services. The mean score for this question was 3.28, with a standard deviation of 1.17. More than half of the public works directors (56.2%) indicated that their department had undertaken either "partial" or "substantial" planning efforts. Based on the descriptive terms provided for these two response levels on the COOP scale, these departments have identified at least 3 planning areas including identifying and prioritizing mission essential functions; locating possible alternate operating facilities; securing vital records, databases, and systems; and establishing written orders of succession and delegation of authority. However, few departments engaged in efforts to disseminate this information to lower levels of management or field employees. More than one third of public works departments (37.7%) in this population report having completed detailed planning efforts and 20 of these agencies have tested their plans in a full scale exercise.
MISSION-ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS
A key component of COOP planning is the identification of an organization's essential functions. An essential function is any service that "enable[s] agencies to provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain safety and well being of the general populace, and sustain the industrial/economic base in an emergency" (FEMA, 2004a, p. 5) . According to the guidelines released by FEMA (2004b), determining which of an organization's functions are essential depends greatly on the organization's structure and mission; time-critical factors; and consequences for failure to perform such functions on public health and safety. At the federal level, agencies of the executive branch are responsible for identifying mission functions that are essential to meeting eight national priorities, including preserving constitutional government, national defense, international relations, and providing federal services that are critical to the health, safety, and welfare of the nation (Petersen, 2005) . On a local level, objectives might include the preservation of life, health, and property; maintenance of confidence in government; ability to keep civil order; and protection of civic infrastructure and the vitality of the local economy. State and local functions generally considered to be essential to meeting these objectives include law enforcement, fire protection, emergency medical services, engineering, finance, and social services (FEMA, 2004b) .
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and some states have specified matrices of time and impact to define essential functions based on the National Response Plan (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004), which advises that federal support to state and local governments is minimally 72 hours away. For example, the State of North Dakota Continuum of Government Processes (North Dakota Office of Management and Budget, Risk Management Division, n.d.) creates four categories of functions to aid agencies in identifying their essential functions. Essential functions are defined as those that, if disrupted for more than 24 hours, will result in significant loss of life, confidence in government, and/or loss of economic integrity. Vital functions create these outcomes after 72 hours. Functions that can be delayed for 2 weeks are classified as necessary, whereas all other functions are considered as desired because they can be disrupted for more than 2 weeks but are still considered to be necessary for the normal 456 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / October 2007 operations of government. By weighing the time frame for negative outcomes against specific government-provided services, organizational leaders can "triage" services into categories and focus planning efforts on those services that are essential for the continuity of government. These efforts also help to identify key interdependencies and interrelationships with nonresponse agencies. Departments without a public safety role-such as human resources, public information, information technology, purchasing, public transportation, and administrationindirectly perform functions that are essential for emergency response and good governance.
Respondents were asked to assess the extent to which their department had "identified and prioritized essential functions that must be performed within 12 hours of an unexpected event or disaster." The mean score for this question was 3.29, with a standard deviation of 1.22. This highest number of respondents (53.1%) reported having either completed "substantial" or "detailed" lists that identified essential functions and prioritized them based on time-critical sensitivity. Of this group, 24 respondents claimed to have allocated resources toward accomplishing these tasks in time of crises. Nineteen departments reported fully completing this portion of their continuity plan.
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY AND ORDERS OF SUCCESSION
The collapse of 2 World Trade Center (WTC) destroyed the fire department incident command post, weakening the FDNY's ability to orchestrate rescue efforts. Command was further degraded with the collapse of 1 WTC, which killed the chief of department and other command officers, leaving the incident without an effective commander (McKinsey & Company, 2002) . Ensuring an orderly succession and decentralizing authority are essential elements of continuity planning. Such elements are usually specified in the city charter, local ordinances, and organizational charts. "Clearly established delegations of authority are vital to ensuring all agency personnel know who has authority to make key decisions" and orders of succession ensure a successful transition of control in the event that senior officials are "incapacitated or unavailable" (FEMA, 2004a, pp. 5-6) . Orders of succession always designate position titles rather than specific individuals. For example, a line of succession for a public works agency might include the director, deputy director, water superintendent, and so forth. Optimally, orders of succession and delegation of authority documents include directions for notification and any limits on authority, position training for successors, and rules for termination of authority and even transfer of authority to persons outside the line of succession.
Planning for the delegation of authority was assessed with the question, "Has your Department identified personnel who have the authority to make key decisions in crises?" Looking across the scales from low (1.0) to high (5.0), the number of departments in each category increases at each level; this result is not demonstrated in any other item in the COOP scale. Indeed, this item had a higher mean (3.6), median (4.0), and modal score (5.0) than any other item. Fifty-five departments (57.3%) reported that they have identified key programs, documented to whom authority is to be delegated, and trained subordinate personnel to perform their emergency duties. More than half of this group also reports that these personnel have acted in these roles in a training scenario. It cannot be determined by this study, however, whether these lines are the result of purposive continuity planning efforts or simply a consequence of a paramilitary-style organizational structure. However, based on the descriptors included in the question, we can conclude that at least some level of planning activity accounts for this finding.
The orders of succession component of COOP was addressed by the question, "To what extent has the Department established orders of success for key positions and granted written authority for successors to make critical decisions?" The mean response to this question was 3.34, with a standard deviation of 1.20. Twenty-three (24.0%) of respondents reported only "preliminary" or "partial" succession planning. The bulk of public works departments (56.3%) reported "substantial" or "detailed" plans, with roughly half of this number (23 out of 50) actually training personnel to assume key leadership positions during a crisis. Nineteen (19.8%) departments have completed this component of COOP.
ALTERNATE OPERATING FACILITIES
The New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) were located at 7 WTC. There was no backup site (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Although the OEM recovered quickly from the destruction of the EOC through improvisation, the loss initially reduced New York City's capacity to manage the incident (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2001) . COOP guidance requires the identification and preparation of alternate facilities that have sufficient space, utilities, logistical support, communications, and data access to carry out the essential functions of the agency. A principle criterion for alternate facilities is that they are resistant to hazards identified in a jurisdictional vulnerability assessment.
Directors were asked, "Is there an existing plan for maintaining your essential operations for alternate facilities if one or more of the structures housing your organization becomes dysfunctional or cannot be occupied?" The identification of alternate operating facilities demonstrated the second lowest mean score at 2.99 (SD = 1.2). A fair portion of public works departments (14.6%) in this sample had not identified any facilities that could be used for impromptu workspace should their primary facility become untenable. However, most agencies had addressed this issue to some extent. Twenty departments (20.8%) report that they had identified potential sites, but these sites would require improvements to become operational. Obviously, the extent of "improvements" will vary depending on the facility, and work efforts to upgrade the new location to operational status will take time and possible redirect efforts away from the provision of essential services to the community. The highest percentage of this population (28.1%) falls into the "substantial" category, which indicates that these departments have secured locations that would have to be equipped to become operational, but that they have developed written plans or procedures for relocating. Slightly more than one third (36.5%) have fully equipped secondary operating facilities, although only 12 of these public works agencies have actually tested their ability to operate effectively from these facilities.
INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS
Interoperability refers to the ability of emergency responders to communicate and work seamlessly via a myriad of voice and data systems. "Communications problems and the inability to coordinate with other disciplines and jurisdictions have been recognized as major operational limitations in every major incident, from the shootings at Columbine High School to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center" (Pessemier, 2006, p. 2) . Implementation of a unified command structure at the WTC was hampered because of a lack of interoperable communications between the FDNY, the New York Police Department, and the Port Authority of New York (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004) .
A survey by the U.S. Conference of Mayors found that 50% of local jurisdictions had interoperable communications between their police, fire, emergency medical services, and public works departments; and 88% of cities were not interoperable with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Conference of Mayors, 2004 ). Yet the "ability of an agency to execute its essential functions . . . is dependent upon the identification, availability, and redundancy of critical communications and information technology systems to support key government leadership, internal elements, other agencies, critical customers, and the public" (FEMA, 2004a, p. 6) . COOP plans should identify communications systems that directly support an agency's essential functions, provide protection from disruption to primary channels of communication, and ensure sufficient redundant backup systems are in place.
The degree of interoperability in public works communications systems was assessed with the question, "Does your Department have redundant communications systems and interoperable communications with emergency response agencies, elected officials, administrative leaders, suppliers and essential partners?" The reported implementation of interoperable communications systems achieved a mean score of 3.20, with a standard deviation of 1.14. Individually, nearly one third (29.2%) of public works departments in this study acknowledge that significant 458 PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY / October 2007 communications challenges exist in their community or that no action had been taken to address this issue. 29.2% of agencies have established backup communications procedures with key partners. Twenty-six (27.1%) departments report having established a redundant, multimodal, interoperable communications system with key partners and 12 (12.5%) more agencies have the same level of planning completeness but have also tested these systems in a full-scale exercise.
VITAL RECORDS AND DATABASES
Vital records, documents, and databases that directly support an agency's essential functions must be protected to ensure they are available to support continuity of those functions during a disruption in normal operations. COOP preparations should include the identification of records that are necessary to support essential functions. There are two subsets of vital recordsemergency operating records and legal and financial records. Agencies should "pre-position and update on a regular basis duplicate records or backup electronic files" (FEMA, 2004a, p. 7) . Protective measures might include replicating agency servers at an off-site facility, scanning paper documents to store in a secure computer, conversion of vital records to digital format, storage of vital records in multiple secure sites, and protection of off-site facilities from jurisdictional hazards.
Directors were asked whether they had identified and protected department documents, references, records, and information systems needed to support essential functions during a crisis. This element had to lowest overall mean of any of the 11 components of a COOP at 2.87 (SD = 1.35), indicating that much work still needs to be done in this area. One fifth of departments (20.8%) indicated that they have yet to identify any of their vital records or develop a plan to protect or recover them. The four remaining levels of measure indicate increasing levels of attention to vital record protection. In all, 21.9% reported at least identifying important records and databases that are vital to their department; 20.8% have duplicated these records; and 22.9% have duplicated important records, databases, and systems and placed backup documents in their alternate operating facility. Finally, 13 departments (13.5%) have utilized these backup records and information systems in a full-scale exercise.
HUMAN CAPITAL
Specific staffing requirements will vary among different agencies and decisions must be made requiring members to perform the agency's essential operations and functions. Addressing the human capital involves personnel notification and callback, employee communication, pay flexibility, staffing flexibility, benefit issues, employee roles and responsibilities, and telework, among others. Of course, personnel remaining at work for extended periods of time will also feel an obligation to family. Planners are wise to assuage such concerns by developing programs that report on employee status to family members as well as initiate welfare checks of family members for employees. The presence of such programs has a tendency to strengthen motivation and reduce anxiety.
Although most managers would argue that every member of their organization plays an important role in providing good service to the agency's customers, each mission-essential function has key personnel that are absolutely vital to the continuity of operations. It is important to conceptualize "key personnel" as key positions, not individual workers, although this may be the case in a select few education-intensive, highly specialized skill sets. Key positions need to be identified and the organization must maintain information about these positions, including current occupants, work requirements of the position, and the location of the key position in the organizational structure.
The public works departments studied have not done as well in identifying key positions (M = 3.31, SD = 1.21) as they have delegating authority (M = 3.64) or lines of succession (M = 3.34), casting at least some shadow over exactly how well COOP plans have addressed Somers / PLANNING FOR OPERATIONAL CONTINUITY 459 human capital issues. Fortunately, only a small percentage of public works departments (7.3%) report no progress toward this effort. In addition, 37.9% have only general guidelines describing what a key position in their organization is or having some preliminary roster available. A total of 42.7% of departments, however, have made significant end roads in this important aspect of COOP by developing rosters and disseminating this information along to managers and employees within the organization. Twenty departments (20.8%) have exercised the activation of key employees.
TESTING, TRAINING, AND EXERCISING
Exercises serve a number of purposes, including identifying weaknesses in plans, revealing gaps in resource needs, clarifying roles and responsibilities, testing communications systems and networks, and improving readiness for a real event (Perry, 2004) . Similarly, to be meaningful and effective, COOP plans must be exercised and updated frequently. Exercises serve as a structured means to check the functionality of COOP plans. FPC-65 requires agencies to develop a multiyear testing, training, and exercise plan that addresses all components of a COOP plan. All personnel who may be impacted by a COOP activation should receive proper training and orientation in the plan. This includes familiarity with operating under the National Incident Management System. At a minimum, all agency personnel should receive an orientation seminar in the COOP plan that includes activation, notification, evacuation, and other emergency procedures. Key agency personnel and COOP team members require advanced training to include (in order of increasing complexity) tabletop exercises, functional exercises, and full-scale exercises. Scenarios should include relocation and operation from identified alternate operating facilities.
"To what extent have you exercised or tested your departmental plans?" was the one question on the COOP scale not measured using the five ordinal levels of preliminary, partial, substantial, detailed, or completed. Instead, public works directors were asked to specifically identify the highest level of training and exercising their department had participated in. plan and their role in it. A functional exercise is usually more complex involving a combination of tasks played out in "real time." Nineteen public works departments (19.8%) stated that they had participated in such a test of their COOP or emergency operations plan. The full-scale exercise is a community-wide test of multiple functions of an emergency plans. These exercises involve multiple agencies with actual players in the field. Thus, full-scale exercises test the coordination and interoperability among agencies. Twenty-three departments (24.0%) report having played a role in just such a test of emergency plans. On the other hand, a good number of public works agencies (17 departments, 17.7% of the departments studied) have not participated or executed any testing of emergency plans on any level. It is unclear-given the scope of this dissertation and the questions asked-why this is the case. Seventeen other departments (17.7%) have also not participated in any testing, but have attended an orientation seminar on COOP that includes discussions on the role of public works agencies in maintaining continuity of local government operations.
DEVOLUTION OF CONTROL AND DIRECTION
"Devolution planning refers to preparation necessary to transfer mission-essential functions of a department or agency to another organizational element, such as a field office, should an organization's AOF or emergency relocation personnel be rendered unavailable or incapacitated" (Department of Homeland Security, 2006, pp. 10-11) . The objective of the devolution of control section of COOP is to "address how an agency will identify and conduct its essential functions during increased threat situations or in the aftermath of a catastrophic emergency" (FEMA, 2004a, p. 9) . It requires that personnel be empowered with the authority to make decisions and direct the operations of the organization to execute the agency's essential functions. This means that alternate personnel must be trained and fully capable of coordinating agency functions in the event that the department's leadership is unavailable or incapacitated.
Devolution was measured with the question, "Is there a current inventory of personnel, equipment and materials as well as operating procedures to address how your Department will seamlessly begin executing essential functions during a crisis?" The mean response to this question was 3.37 (SD = 1.20). Nearly a quarter of public works departments (24.0%) state that they have specific lists and procedures for emergency use in place and that they have been tested in a full-scale exercise; a further 19.8% report that these plans are complete but have yet to be tested. Twenty-five more departments (26%) indicate that they have begun to plan for devolution. However, 24.2% of this population have inventory lists appropriate only for routine operations (16 departments) or have no detailed inventory at all (7 departments).
RECONSTRUCTION
This final element recognizes that "extensive coordination is necessary to procure a new operating site once an agency suffers a facility loss" (FEMA, 2004a, p. 9) . Agencies should have procedures for returning to normal operating status once a threat or disruption has passed. Plans to return to normalcy should include notification of personnel that the threat has been mitigated; identification of specific actions for transferring communications, direction and control, and operations to primary facilities; and the conducting of an after-action review to assess all elements of the COOP implementation (FEMA, 2004b) .
A final question asked was, "Does your Department have a plan to transition from temporary emergency operations back to normal operations status once the threat or disruption has passed?" As a whole, public works departments in the population studied scored mean values below the center of the scale (3.0) at 2.95, although the standard deviation was 1.14. Seventeen departments have no explicit plans for the resumption of normal operations. In addition, 15 departments (15.6%) rely on general guidelines, although even these have not been disseminated to key operations personnel, raising questions on how effective these guidelines might be during a crisis. However, the majority of the agencies surveyed have addressed this challenge to varying degrees. The highest proportion of departments (31.3%) fall into the "substantial" category, indicating that procedures for transition have been outlined, and there has been some dissemination of this information among management. The remaining departments are reporting in the "detailed" (22.9%) or "completed" (11.5%) categories, where reconstruction plans have been preplanned, documented, and passed down through the organization. Again, only those public works departments reporting a "completed" plan element have actually tested it in a full-scale exercise.
Characterizing Continuity Planning Efforts
Thus far, this article has reported on the findings of a survey to inquire about the completion of 11 elements of a COOP plan. Each of these 11 items measured a different property of continuity (e.g., prioritizing essential functions or identification of alternate operating facilities) and respondents were asked to give a rating of his or her own organization in each question. To develop an overall picture of the degree to which public works agency has attended to measures likely to enhance operational continuity during disaster, a summated rating scale was created using these 11 elements of a COOP plan. The lower anchor of the scale is 1.0 representing a public works agency that had developed none of the 11 elements. The upper limit of the index was 5.0, representing a public works agency with a comprehensive COOP plan that had been tested in a full-scale, community-wide disaster exercise.
Among the departments studied, the lowest score was 1.09 and only four departments recorded the highest possible score of 5.0. The mean score on this scale was 3.23 (SD = .98), with 59% of public works departments recording scores at or below the mid-range values. These statistics indicate that there is a clustering of organizations at or slightly below the center of the scale. Although there is no absolute interpretation of these scaled scores, this distribution indicates that-although some planning efforts have been undertaken-a majority of public works agencies in this sample are at risk for breakdowns in the provision of essential service in crisis situations. Public works agencies need to intensify planning efforts to ensure operational continuity.
Discussion and Conclusions
This article has provided a discussion on the history of COOP planning, identified the elements of an effective COOP plan, and measured compliance among a sample of municipal public works agencies through a survey of department directors. Six years after September 11, 2001, and more than two years after the lessons of Hurricane Katrina along the Gulf Coast, significant efforts still need to be undertaken by public works departments in preparing for operational continuity in a postdisaster environment. This is particularly disconcerting considering that the bulk of the returns came from directors in Texas, which in 2006 received more Presidential Major Disaster or Emergency Declarations than any other state in the union (78). Oklahoma was also well represented in this sample and received the sixth most Declarations (49).
The analysis shows that only 4 departments out of the 96 departments returning questionnaires report having a completed, comprehensive COOP plan. A key concern is that more than 27% of public works agencies have not identified their essential functions, let alone prioritized them based on time sensitivity. Out of the remaining departments, only 19 had actually conducted an exercise to identify plan deficiencies or evaluate key personnel in their roles and responsibilities. Such recurring drills and exercises are critical to maintaining an appropriate degree of COOP capability. In addition, identification of vital records, databases, and communications systems to support the flow of critical information in a timely manner was not well addressed. Conversely, these public works departments have done more to establish lines of authority for decision making. It was beyond the scope of this research to determine precisely why a department had or had not developed a COOP, although past research has looked at correlates of disaster planning generally. Looking specifically at COOP compliance, research at the federal level has shown a lack of oversight to be a significant contributing cause of deficiencies in agency continuity plans (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2004) . GAO (2005) recommendations for improving planning include developing a short-term strategy for oversight of COOP planning activities, developing and implementing procedures that verify agency-reported data used to develop plans, and developing guidelines on the steps agencies should take to implement alternative work processes during emergency operations. These recommendations are likely to translate well to local government. The American Public Works Association could play a key role in developing continuity "best practices" for COOP in pubic works, as well as establishing minimum standards for continuity planning as a condition of accreditation. Responsibility for appropriate planning, however, falls to public works management and city officials.
Another potential limitation on COOP planning is a lack of appropriate funding. Consequently, there is the possibility that budgetary decisions will limit the availability of even the minimum necessary resources needed for COOP activities. Prior to 9/11, federal programs to support local emergency planning and preparedness efforts were modest and largely targeted to specific activities such as the Metropolitan Medical Response System, created by the 1996 Nunn-LugarDominechi Act, which focused on medical response to terrorist attacks. There was a surge in funding following 9/11, generating a variety of programs ranging from infrastructure protection to the Urban Areas Security Initiative. Although none of these programs specifically addressed COOP, most permitted funding for planning and other activities that fall under the COOP umbrella. Then in May 2007, President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 51 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 20, creating a National Continuity Policy. NSPD-51/HSPD-20 requires integration of federal continuity planning with the "emergency plans and capabilities of state, local, territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate, in order to promote interoperability" (Bush, 2007, Sec. 10) . The directive also calls on the Secretary of Homeland Security to make available continuity planning and exercise funding, in the form of grants to state, local, and tribal governments. It is too early to determine how much funding will be available to public works agencies or how monies will be distributed.
This study only documents the reported compliance with COOP practices. It does not detail the quality or appropriateness of plans in local public works departments. To ensure that essential local government services are available in emergencies, a more thorough examination of such plans themselves needs to be conducted. Such an examination would likely involve a review of actual plans from public works departments, comparing them against FEMA or other professional guidelines. Such a study must include evaluations to confirm that essential functions are correctly and appropriately identified, otherwise plans would not ensure that the most vital public works functions would be maintained during a crisis. Municipalities may also undertake a similar review by examining COOP documents from all city departments, private contractors, and key suppliers and partners to ascertain the level of community-wide preparedness with regard to continuity. Partnering with the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, or the Public Entity Risk Institute would aid in the efficacy of conducting such studies across cities and would provide meaningful information for policymakers as well as a benchmark for local level COOP preparedness. 
In May 2007, President

